CPLR R. 5015 Relief from judgment or order
Kramer v Oil Servs., Inc., 2009 NY Slip Op 06121 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)
A defendant seeking to vacate its default in appearing or answering the complaint must provide a reasonable excuse for the default and demonstrate the existence of a meritorious defense to the action (see CPLR 5015[a]; Lemberger v Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc., 33 AD3d 671, 672; Krieger v Cohan, 18 AD3d 823; Kaplinsky v Mazor, 307 AD2d 916). The only excuse proffered by the appellant for the default in serving a timely answer was the more than one-year delay caused by its insurance carrier in providing a defense which, under the circumstances, was insufficient (see Toland v Young, 60 AD3d 754; Martinez v D'Alessandro Custom Bldrs. & Demolition, Inc., 52 AD3d 786; Canty v Gregory, 37 AD3d 508; Lemberger v Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc., 33 AD3d at 672; Krieger v Cohan, 18 AD3d 823; Hegarty v Ballee, 18 AD3d [*2]706). Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the appellant's motion.
Recently I received a comment questioning why some decision require defendant to show a "potentially" meritorious defense and others require them to show meritorious defense. I suggested that "potentially meritorious" might be a middle ground between an "interests of justice" vacatur and and a normal meritorious defense vacatur. I know, that sentence is anything but clear. But I think you get the idea.
So, yeah, I'm still looking into it. I meant to do it over the weekend, but life got in the way. And I'm lazy. Eventually I will get to it, I swear.
The bold is mine.