theCPLRblog

So is CPLR R. 3216

CPLR R. 3216

Kadyimov v Mackinnon, 82 AD3d 938] (App. Div., 2^nd 2011)

CPLR 3216 is an "extremely forgiving" statute (Baczkowski v Collins Constr. Co., 89 NY2d 499, 503 [1997]), which "never requires, but merely authorizes, the Supreme Court to dismiss a plaintiff's action based on the plaintiff's unreasonable neglect to proceed" (Davis v Goodsell, 6 AD3d 382, 383 [2004]; see Di Simone v Good Samaritan Hosp., 100 NY2d 632, 633 [2003]; Gibson v Fakheri, 77 AD3d 619 [2010]; Ferrera v Esposit, 66 AD3d 637, 638 [2009]). Although the statute prohibits the Supreme Court from dismissing a complaint based on failure to prosecute whenever the plaintiff has shown a justifiable excuse for the delay and the existence of a potentially meritorious cause of action, "such a dual showing is not strictly necessary in order for the plaintiff to escape such a dismissal" (Davis v Goodsell, 6 AD3d at 384; see Baczkowski v Collins Constr. Co., 89 NY2d at 503-504; Gibson v Fakheri, 77 AD3d 619 [2010]; Ferrera v Esposit, 66 AD3d at 638). 

Here, the plaintiff attempted to file her note of issue 11 days beyond the deadline set by the Supreme Court's certification order, and moved for relief shortly after learning that the case had been marked "disposed." Moreover, the defendants did not claim to have been prejudiced by the minimal delay involved in this case. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record of a pattern of persistent neglect and delay in prosecuting the action, or of any intent to abandon the action. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in excusing the plaintiff's failure to meet the deadline for filing the note of issue (see Ferrera v Esposit, 66 AD3d at 638; Zito v Jastremski, 35 AD3d 458, 459 [2006]; Diaz v Yuan, 28 AD3d 603 [2006]).

Gagnon v Campbell, 2011 NY Slip Op 06092 (2^nd Dept. 2011)

The defendant served the plaintiff's attorney with a valid 90-day demand pursuant to CPLR 3216 on January 9, 2008. Upon receipt of the 90-day demand, the plaintiff was required to comply with it either by serving and filing a timely note of issue or by moving, before the default date, to vacate the demand or to extend the 90-day period pursuant to CPLR 2004 (see Sanchez v Serje, 78 AD3d 1155, 1156; Bokhari v Home Depot U.S.A., 4 AD3d 381; McKinney v Corby, 295 AD2d 580, 581). Having failed to pursue any of the foregoing options, the plaintiff was obligated to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the delay and a potentially meritorious cause of action to avoid the sanction of dismissal (see CPLR 3216[e]; Dominguez v Jamaica Med. Ctr., 72 AD3d 876; Picot v City of New York, 50 AD3d 757, 758; McKinney v Corby, 295 AD2d at 581; Flomenhaft v Baron, 281 AD2d 389). In renewing her opposition to the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3216, the plaintiff failed to offer new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination (see CPLR 2221[e][2]; Jackson Hgts. Care Ctr., LLC v Bloch, 39 AD3d 477, 480). The plaintiff failed to submit any medical evidence demonstrating that she sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject motor vehicle accident (see Louis v MTA Long Is. Bus Co., 44 AD3d 628; Parks v Miclette, 41 AD3d 1107, 1110; Berktas v McMillian, 40 AD3d 563, 563-564). Therefore, the plaintiff failed [*2]to demonstrate that she has a potentially meritorious cause of action.

3216, very forgiving, etc etc

CPLR R. 3216 Want of prosecution

CPLR § 1015 Substitution upon death

CPLR § 1021 Substitution procedure; dismissal for failure to substitute; presentation of appeal

Atterberry v Serlin & Serlin, 2011 NY Slip Op 05439 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)

CPLR 3216 is an "extremely forgiving" statute (Baczkowski v Collins Constr. Co., 89 NY2d 499, 503), which "never requires, but merely authorizes, the Supreme Court to dismiss a plaintiff's action based on the plaintiff's unreasonable neglect to proceed" (Davis v Goodsell, 6 AD3d 382, 383; see Di Simone v Good Samaritan Hosp., 100 NY2d 632, 633; Gibson v Fakheri, 77 AD3d 619; Ferrera v Esposit, 66 AD3d 637, 638). Although the statute prohibits the Supreme Court from dismissing an action based on failure to prosecute whenever the plaintiff has shown a justifiable excuse for the delay and the existence of a potentially meritorious cause of action, "such a dual showing is not strictly necessary in order for the plaintiff to escape such a dismissal" (Davis v Goodsell, 6 AD3d at 384; see Baczkowski v Collins Constr. Co., 89 NY2d at 503-504; Gibson v Fakheri, 77 AD3d 619; Ferrera v Esposit, 66 AD3d at 638).

Here, the plaintiff attempted to file her note of issue 10 days beyond the deadline set by the Supreme Court's certification order, and the defendants did not claim that they have been prejudiced by the minimal delay (see Kadyimov v MacKinnon, 82 AD3d 938). In addition, the delay in filing a note of issue was attributable to law office failure, and the plaintiff proffered both a reasonable excuse for her further two-month delay in making this motion and a potentially meritorious cause of action (see CPLR 2005; Lauri v Freeport Union Free School Dist., 78 AD3d 1130; Goldstein v Meadows Redevelopment Co Owners Corp. I, 46 AD3d 509, 510; Diaz v Yuan, 28 AD3d 603). Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record of a pattern of persistent neglect and delay in prosecuting the action, or of any intent to abandon the action. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff's motion to vacate the dismissal of the action pursuant to CPLR 3216 and to extend her time to file a note of issue should have been granted (see Kadyimov v MacKinnon, 82 AD3d 938; Ferrera v Esposit, 66 AD3d at 638; Anonymous v Duane Reade, Inc., 49 AD3d 479; Diaz v Yuan, 28 AD3d 603).

Sanders v New York City Hous. Auth., 2011 NY Slip Op 05479 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)

In light of the approximate three-year delay between the death of the plaintiff and the appointment of the appellant as the administratrix of the plaintiff's estate, the further three-year delay between the appointment of the appellant as administratrix and the underlying motion, inter alia, seeking her substitution in this action, the failure to proffer any excuse for the delays, and the failure to show that the action was potentially meritorious, that branch of the appellant's motion which was for substitution was properly denied (see CPLR 1021; Reed v Grossi, 59 AD3d 509, 511; McDonnell v Draizin, 24 AD3d 628; Washington v Min Chung Hwan, 20 AD3d 303, 305). 

Furthermore, that branch of the appellant's motion which was to vacate the dismissal of the action pursuant to CPLR 3216 also was properly denied, as she failed to demonstrate a justifiable excuse for the plaintiff's delay in properly responding to the 90-day notice and a potentially meritorious cause of action (see CPLR 3216[e]; Fenner v County of Nassau, 80 AD3d 555, 556; Petersen v Lysaght, Lysaght & Kramer, P.C., 47 AD3d 783, 784; Matter of Bloom v Lubow, 45 AD3d 680; Lugauer v Forest City Ratner Co., 44 AD3d 829, 830; Sortino v Fisher, 20 AD2d 25, 31-32).

3

3216

CPLR R. 3216 Want of prosecution

Umeze v Fidelis Care N.Y., 2011 NY Slip Op 04770 (Ct. App. 2011)

Supreme Court abused its discretion by declining to grant defendants' motion to  dismiss without condition. Plaintiff failed to establish a (1) justifiable excuse for his failure to timely file a note of issue and (2) meritorious cause of action (see CPLR 3216 [e]; see also Baczkowski v Collins Constr. Co., 89 NY2d 499 [1997]).

Banik v Evy Realty, LLC, 2011 NY Slip Op 04185 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)

On September 25, 2009, the Supreme Court, sua sponte, dismissed the action. By notice of motion dated February 3, 2010, the plaintiffs moved, in effect, to vacate the dismissal of the action and to restore the action to active status. The appellant opposed the plaintiffs' motion. In an order dated April 14, 2010, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied those branches of the plaintiffs' motion which were, in effect, to vacate the dismissal and to restore the action as against the defendant Evy Realty, LLC (hereinafter Evy), to active status. In an order dated August 4, 2010, however, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for leave to reargue and, upon reargument, granted those branches of the plaintiffs' motion which had previously been denied. Evy appeals from the order dated August 4, 2010.

Neither the order dated April 14, 2010, nor the order appealed from contain any explanation for the original denial of those branches of the plaintiffs' motion which were, in effect, to vacate the dismissal and to restore the action as against Evy to active status or the subsequent granting, upon reargument, of those branches of the plaintiffs' motion. In addition, the record is not clear as to why the action was dismissed on September 25, 2009, in the first instance. The record]is devoid of any evidence that there was a conference scheduled for September 25, 2009, and there was no order dismissing the complaint pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27. Thus, contrary to Evy's contentions, 22 NYCRR 202.27 could not have provided the basis for the order dated April 14, 2010, denying those branches of the plaintiffs' motion which were to vacate the dismissal and restore the action to active status with respect to it (see Mitskevitch v City of New York, 78 AD3d 1137, 1138; Clark v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 23 AD3d 510, 511; Murray v Smith Corp., 296 AD2d 445, 446).

Furthermore, while the failure to comply with a court order directing the filing of a note of issue can, in the proper circumstances, provide the basis for the dismissal of a complaint under CPLR 3216, courts are prohibited from dismissing an action based on neglect to prosecute unless the CPLR 3216 statutory preconditions to dismissal are met (see Baczkowski v Collins Constr. Co., 89 NY2d 499, 502-503; Murray v Smith Corp., 296 AD2d at 447; Schwartz v Nathanson, 261 AD2d 527, 528; Schuering v Stella, 243 AD2d 623, 624). Here, a compliance conference order dated December 9, 2008, which set a date for the filing of the note of issue, did not constitute a valid 90-day demand because there was no warning that failure to file the note of issue by June 5, 2009, would serve as a basis for dismissal under CPLR 3216 (see Sanchez v Serje, 78 AD3d 1155, 1156; Ratway v Donnenfeld, 43 AD3d 465; Patel v MBG Dev., Inc., 41 AD3d 682, 683). Moreover, a so-ordered stipulation dated September 24, 2009, which extended the plaintiffs' time to file a note of issue until January 19, 2010, could not be deemed a 90-day demand since it failed to advise the plaintiffs that the failure to comply therewith would serve as the basis for a motion to dismiss the action (see Wasif v Khan, 82 AD3d 1084; Heifetz v Godoy, 38 AD3d 605; Wollman v Berliner, 29 AD3d 786).

Accordingly, upon reargument, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the plaintiffs' motion which were, in effect, to vacate the dismissal of the action as against Evy and to restore the action as against Evy to active status.

 

 

Order directing to file NOI the same as 90 day notice.

CPLR R. 3216 Want of prosecution

CPLR § 2004 Extensions of time generally

Fenner v County of Nassau, 2011 NY Slip Op 00178 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)

The certification order of the Supreme Court dated February 19, 2008, directing the plaintiff to file a note of issue within 90 days, and warning that the complaint would be deemed dismissed without further order of the Supreme Court if the plaintiff failed to comply with that directive, had the same effect as a valid 90-day notice pursuant to CPLR 3216 (see Sicoli v Sasson, 76 AD3d 1002; Rodriguez v Five Towns Nissan, 69 AD3d 833; Petersen v Lysaght, Lysaght & Kramer, P.C., 47 AD3d 783). Having received a 90-day notice, the plaintiff was required either to serve and file a timely note of issue or to move pursuant to CPLR 2004, prior to the default date, to extend the time within which to serve and file a note of issue (see Sharpe v Osorio, 21 AD3d 467, 468; DeVore v Lederman, 14 AD3d 648, 649; Bokhari v Home Depot U.S.A., 4 AD3d 381, 382). In light of the plaintiff's failure to do either, the complaint was properly dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3216 (see Petersen v Lysaght, Lysaght & Kramer, P.C., 47 AD3d 783).

To vacate the dismissal of the complaint, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate a justifiable excuse for his failure to comply with the certification order and the existence of a potentially meritorious cause of action (see CPLR 3216[e]; Baczkowski v Collins Constr. Co., 89 NY2d 499, 503; Rodriguez v Five Towns Nissan, 69 AD3d at 834; Davis v Cardiovascular Consultants of Long Is., P.C., 65 AD3d 1076, 1077; Petersen v Lysaght, Lysaght & Kramer, P.C., 47 AD3d 783). [*2]

In support of his motion, the plaintiff failed to proffer any excuse for his failure to comply with the certification order. The excuse of law office failure proffered by the plaintiff's attorney for the first time in a reply affirmation was not properly before the Supreme Court (seeCPLR 2214; 47 Thames Realty, LLC v Robinson, 61 AD3d 923, 924; Murray v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 52 AD3d 792, 794; Levine v Forgotson's Cent. Auto & Elec., Inc., 41 AD3d 552, 553). Moreover, the conclusory and unsubstantiated claim of law office failure did not rise to the level of a reasonable excuse (see Petersen v Lysaght, Lysaght & Kramer, P.C., 47 AD3d at 784; Matter of Bloom v Lubow, 45 AD3d 680; Lugauer v Forest City Ratner Co., 44 AD3d 829, 830). Furthermore, the plaintiff's motion papers failed to establish the existence of a potentially meritorious cause of action (see Dixon v Village of Spring Val., 50 AD3d 943; Apostolakis v Centereach Fire Dist., 300 AD2d 516; Sandstrom v Rodriguez, 221 AD2d 513).

 

Same effect, but different cause. CPLR R. 3216

CPLR R. 3216 Want of prosecution

CPLR § 2004 Extensions of time generally

Sicoli v Sasson, 2010 NY Slip Op 06625 (App. Div., 2nd 2010)

The recertification order of the Supreme Court dated July 16, 2008, directing the plaintiffs to file a note of issue within 90 days and warning that the action would be deemed dismissed without further order of the court if the plaintiffs failed to comply with that directive, had the same effect as a valid 90-day notice pursuant to CPLR 3216 (see Rodriguez v Five Towns Nissan, 69 AD3d 833; Petersen v Lysaght, Lysaght & Kramer, P.C., 47 AD3d 783; Sustad v Karagiannis, 305 AD2d 664). Having received a 90-day notice, the plaintiffs were required either to file a timely note of issue or to move, before the default date, for an extension of time pursuant to CPLR 2004 (see Bokhari v Home Depot U.S.A., 4 AD3d 381, 382; Apicella v Estate of Apicella, 305 AD2d 621; Aguilar v Knutson, 296 AD2d 562). The plaintiffs did neither.

To avoid the dismissal of the action, the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their failure to comply with the recertification order and the existence of a potentially meritorious cause of action (see Rodriguez v Five Towns Nissan, 69 AD3d 833; Bokhari[*2]v Home Depot U.S.A., 4 AD3d 381, 382; Sustad v Karagiannis, 305 AD2d 664). Even assuming that the plaintiffs provided a reasonable excuse for their default (see CPLR 2005; Giannoccoli v One Cent. Park W. Assoc., 15 AD3d 348, 349; Betty v City of New York, 12 AD3d 472, 473-474; Association for Children with Learning Disabilities, Nassau Ch. v Zafar, 115 AD2d 580, 581), they failed to demonstrate a potentially meritorious cause of action. The affirmation of the plaintiffs' medical expert was insufficient to demonstrate that the causes of action alleging medical malpractice and lack of informed consent were potentially meritorious, since, inter alia, the medical expert failed to establish that his opinions were grounded in facts appearing in the hospital or medical records (see Bollino v Hitzig, 34 AD3d 711; Perez v Astoria Gen. Hosp., 260 AD2d 457, 458; Nepomniaschi v Goldstein, 182 AD2d 743, 744). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the motions, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3216 to dismiss the action and properly denied the plaintiffs' cross motion to extend the time to serve and file a note of issue. 

The bold is mine.  Note that the Appellate Division says that it has the same effect as a "valid" 90-day notice.  Look at the requirements for a valid 90-day notice.  The recertification order is missing something.  Lisa Solomon and Marshall R. Isaacs wrote about this not too long ago.

 

"CPLR 3216 'is extremely forgiving of litigation delay'"

CPLR R. 3216 Want of prosecution

Umeze v Fidelis Care N.Y., 2010 NY Slip Op 06603 (App. Div., 1st 2010)

"When served with a 90-day demand pursuant to CPLR 3216, it is incumbent upon a plaintiff to comply with the demand by filing a note of issue or by moving, before the default date, to either vacate the notice or extend the 90-day period" (Primiano v Ginsberg, 55 AD3d 709, 709 [2008]; see Serby v Long Is. Jewish Med. Ctr., 34 AD3d 441 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 805 [2007]). Here, having done neither, to avoid dismissal, this pro se plaintiff was required to show both a "justifiable excuse for the delay and a good and meritorious cause of action" (CPLR 3216[e]). Furthermore, CPLR 3216 "is extremely forgiving of litigation delay" (Baczkowski v Collins Constr. Co., 89 NY2d 499, 503 [1997]), and "[t]he nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed on a motion to dismiss for want of prosecution is a matter of discretion with the court" (Espinoza v 373-381 Park Ave. S., LLC, 68 AD3d 532, 533 [2009]).

Based on the foregoing principles and under the circumstances presented, the motion court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to dismiss conditioned on plaintiff resuming prosecution of the action within 10 days of service of the order with notice of entry. Plaintiff's attempts to obtain counsel twice during this litigation indicate that there was no intent to abandon the action (see e.g. Di Simone v Good Samaritan Hosp., 100 NY2d 632, 633-634 [2003]). This includes that, in response to the 90-day notice, plaintiff contacted an attorney who, in a September 15, 2008 letter, stated that his firm was considering substituting for the "pro se plaintiff" and requested an additional 30 days to decide whether to take the case. Thus, plaintiff clearly met with an attorney in an attempt to resume this litigation. There is also evidence in the record that counsel for the defense refused to call back plaintiff's initial counsel. Contrary to defendants' contention, the "complaint, verified by plaintiff on the basis of personal knowledge and which detailed [the defendants'] acts of negligence, was a sufficient affidavit of merits" (Salch v Paratore, 60 NY2d 851, 852-53 [1983]).

All concur except Gonzalez, P.J. and Catterson, J. who dissent in a [*2]memorandum by Catterson, J. as follows:

 

CATTERSON, J. (dissenting)

I must respectfully dissent because in my opinion, the motion court improvidently exercised its discretion by allowing the plaintiff additional time after he failed to file a note of issue in response to the defendants' 90-day demand, and failed to proffer a justifiable excuse for not so doing. Specifically, I disagree with the majority's reliance on the Court of Appeals' observation in Baczkowski v. Collins Constr. Co. (89 N.Y.2d 499, 503, 655 N.Y.S.2d 848, 850, 678 N.E.2d 460, 462 (1997)) that CPLR 3216 is "extremely forgiving of litigation delay." The Court's observation is made upon the recitation of precisely those statutory requirements - filing the note of issue or tendering a justifiable excuse for not so doing — with which the plaintiff in this case failed to comply.

Make sure to click on the case to read the remainder of the dissent.  The bold is mine.

What CPLR?

 Lisa Solomon and Marshall R. Isaacs have an interesting post over at the NYSBA's Smallfirmville blog about the variations in how the Courts interpret or ignore the CPLR throughout the counties.  They start with CPLR R. 3216.  Specifically, they talk about what is going on in Brooklyn. There the judges are giving a date by which the NOI must be filed.  Failure to file will result in dismissal. CPLR R. 3216 does not allow the Court to dismiss without certain requirements being met.  And one of those requirements is that the notice be sent by "registered or certified mail." 

The Appellate Division appears to allow this to go on, by finding that a court order directing that a NOI be filed by a certain date, has "the same effect as a 90-day notice pursuant to CPLR 3216."  See, Shcherbina v Queens Nassau Nursing Home, Inc., 2009 NY Slip Op 07615 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)¹.  By giving it the same effect, the Appellate Division appears to take the court's notice outside the specific requirement of CPLR R. 3216.  It's different, but the same.  Compare Shcherbina with Passet v Menorah Nursing Home, Inc., 2009 NY Slip Op 09009 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009) where the Appellate Division told us "CPLR 3216 permits a court to dismiss an action for want of prosecution only after the court or the defendant has served the plaintiff with a written notice...." Did you notice how Passet said nothing about the manner of notice?  Weird, right?

Check out CPLR § 3215(c), which tells the court that it "shall" dismiss, whether on it's own "initiative or on motion."  Notice the differences in the language of Rule 3216 and Section 3215.  One has a specific notice requirement, the other doesn't.  That should matter.  Moreover, CPLR R. 3216 doesn't allow the courts to mess around the method or timing, like CPLR R. 3212(a) does.  Well, to be clear, CPLR R. 3212(a) doesn't allow for a change in the method; only the timing.

While we are on the subject of paying attention to the language, remember CPLR § 205(a)?  Yeah, that one.  The one that requires courts to make certain findings before dismissing pursuant to CPLR R. 3216.  No one is paying attention to that.

You should check out the rest of the post.  They go on to discuss other issues and what can be done about them.

Wow.  I made a post that barely contained any copy and pasting.  Hooray for me.

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1.  Check out Davis v Cardiovascular Consultants of Long Is., P.C., 2009 NY Slip Op 06501 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009) and my post where I pointed out the whole "registered or certified mail" part.  There have been a lot of decisions like this lately. 

A tricky case (CPLR R. 3216)

CPLR R. 3216 Want of prosecution

Cadichon v Facelle, 2010 NY Slip Op 02058 (App. Div., 1st, 2010)

It is well settled that to vacate the dismissal of an action dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3216, a plaintiff must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the failure to comply with the 90-day demand to serve and file a note of issue and a meritorious cause of action (Walker v City of New York, 46 AD3d 278 [2007]). Plaintiffs failed to offer a reasonable excuse for their failure to file the note of issue. Indeed, while plaintiffs contended that defendants' noncompliance with their discovery obligations was to blame, and that such noncompliance was preventing them from filing a note of issue, "[they] had [their] remedies during the lengthy period of general delay (CPLR 3124, 3126)" (McDonald v Montefiore Med. Ctr., 60 AD3d 547, 547 [2009]).

While we do not disagree with the dissent's conclusion that some of the delay was occasioned by defendant, our decision rests on the record and controlling law which required plaintiffs to take action. Once served with a 90-day demand, plaintiffs were required to either seek an extension to comply with the 90-day notice, move to vacate the same (Brady v Benenson Capital Co., 2 AD3d 382, 382 [2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 702 [2004]) or file a note of issue [*2](CPLR 3216[b][3]). Plaintiffs did none of these things and their case was thus properly dismissed. Subsequent to dismissal, vacatur required a quantum of proof which plaintiffs utterly failed to satisfy with their first motion, and which they were unable to cure with the their second motion.

Plaintiffs also impermissibly addressed the merits of their action for the first time on reply (Migdol v City of New York, 291 AD2d 201, 201 [2002]; Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v Morse Shoe Company, 218 AD2d 624, 625-626 [1995]; Ritt v Lenox Hill Hosp., 182 AD2d 560, 562 [1992].

The excuse of law office failure offered on the motion to reargue and renew did not constitute a reasonable excuse (Walker, 46 AD3d at 280-281). Further, plaintiffs failed to explain why they failed to present the excuse of law office failure on the original motion.

Remember the recent amendment to CPLR 205.  Why doesn't it apply here?  The dissent explains.

On the motion to renew, counsel explained that the conference resulting in the May 3, 2007 so-ordered stipulation was handled by an "of counsel" attorney, and thus, the December 27, 2007 deadline set by the court for the filing of the note of issue was not entered into the firm's calendar system as would ordinarily be done. Counsel further stated that had he known about the deadline, he would have moved for an extension of time to file the note of issue and/or to strike defendants' answers based on defendants' failure to comply with discovery. I would hold that this failure to calendar the date was, under the circumstances, excusable law office failure (see Kaufman v Bauer, 36 AD3d 481 [2007] [deadline missed due to personnel change at law firm]; Werner v Tiffany & Co., 291 AD2d 305 [2002] [counsel misplaced calendar and in reconstructing commitments forgot deadline]), particularly given defendants' delays and plaintiffs' inability, as a direct result thereof, to certify that discovery was complete. While this case was decided before the effective date of the amendment to CPLR 205, which provides that an action may not be dismissed under CPLR 3216 unless the judge sets forth "on the record the specific conduct constituting the neglect, which conduct shall demonstrate a general pattern of delay in proceeding with the litigation," it is not without significance that plaintiffs did not engage in a pattern of neglect.

While I agree with the motion court that the better practice would have been for plaintiffs to have made a motion to compel discovery or for an extension of time to file the note of issue, the failure to take these steps should not result in dismissal of a meritorious cause of action. It is [*4]the long established public policy of this State to decide cases on their merits (see Kaufman v Bauer, 36 AD3d at 483).

The bold is mine.

CPLR R. 3216 Must Contain Certain Language & CC Order Can Have the Same Effect as a 90-day Notice

CPLR R. 3216 Want of prosecution

Itskov v Menorah Home & Hosp. for the Aged & Infirm, 2009 NY Slip Op 08999 (App. Div., 1st, 2009)

Here, the defendant's notice dated November 5, 2007, demanding that the plaintiffs serve and file a note of issue cannot be deemed a notice pursuant to CPLR 3216 because it failed to notify the plaintiffs that they were "to resume prosecution of the action and to serve and file a note of issue within ninety days after receipt of such demand" (CPLR 3216[b][3] [emphasis added]; cf. Johnson v Minskoff & Sons, 287 AD2d 233, 238). Since no proper notice was received by the plaintiffs prior to the defendant's motion, the Supreme Court was not authorized to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3216 (see Rose v Aziz, 60 AD3d at 926; Harrison v Good Samaritan Hosp. Med. Ctr., 43 AD3d at 997; Schuering v Stella, 243 AD2d at 624).

Passet v Menorah Nursing Home, Inc., 2009 NY Slip Op 09009 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

CPLR 3216 permits a court to dismiss an action for want of prosecution only after the court or the defendant has served the plaintiff with a written notice demanding that the plaintiff resume prosecution of the action and serve and file a note of issue within 90 days after receipt of the demand, and also stating that the failure to comply with the demand will serve as the basis for a motion to dismiss the action (see Rose v Aziz, 60 AD3d 925, 926). Since CPLR 3216 is a legislative creation and not part of a court's inherent power (see Cohn v Borchard Affiliations, 25 NY2d 237, 248), the failure to serve a written notice that conforms to the provisions of CPLR 3216 is the failure of a condition precedent to dismissal of the action (see Airmont Homes v Town of Ramapo, 69 NY2d 901, 902; Rose v Aziz, 60 AD3d at 926; Harrison v Good Samaritan Hosp. Med. Ctr., 43 AD3d 996, 997; Schuering v Stella, 243 AD2d 623, 624).

Here, the defendants' notice demanding that the plaintiff serve and file a note of issue cannot be deemed a notice pursuant to CPLR 3216 because it failed to notify the plaintiff that she was "to resume prosecution of the action and to serve and file a note of issue within ninety days after receipt of such demand" (CPLR 3216[b][3] [emphasis added]; cf. Johnson v Minskoff & Sons, 287 AD2d 233, 238). Since no proper notice was received by the plaintiff prior to the defendants' motion, the Supreme Court was not authorized to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3216 (see Rose v Aziz, 60 AD3d at 926; Harrison v Good Samaritan Hosp. Med. Ctr., 43 AD3d at 997; Schuering v Stella, 243 AD2d at 624).

Shcherbina v Queens Nassau Nursing Home, Inc., 2009 NY Slip Op 07615 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

In a compliance conference order dated April 1, 2003, the Supreme Court directed the plaintiff to file a note of issue on or before July 1, 2003, and warned that the action would be dismissed if the plaintiff failed to comply. Counsel for the plaintiff signed the order. This order had the same effect as a 90-day notice pursuant to CPLR 3216 (see Felix v County of Nassau, 52 AD3d 653, 653; Anjum v Karagoz, 48 AD3d 605, 605; Hoffman v Kessler, 28 AD3d 718). The plaintiff failed to comply with this order either by filing a timely note of issue or by moving to extend the period for doing so, and the action was properly dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3216 (see Felix v County of Nassau, 52 AD3d 653, 653-654; Anjum v Karagoz, 48 AD3d 605, 605). Since the plaintiff waited three years to move to vacate the dismissal of the action, the motion was untimely and should have been denied (see Vinikour v Jamaica Hosp., 2 AD3d 518, 519).

The bold is mine.

Compare the last two decisions with A.M. Med., P.C. v State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 NY Slip Op 28487 (App. Term, 2nd, 2008)

Wow, I just realized that these are all nursing home cases.  Weird.

Stipulations, Orders, and Defaults: CPLR R. 5015; CPLR § 2005; CPLR R. 3216; CPLR § 2004

CPLR R. 5015 Relief from judgment or order

CPLR § 2005 Excusable delay or default

Davidson v Valentin, 2009 NY Slip Op 06500 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

On October 26, 2007, a stipulation was "so-ordered," in which the parties consented to the entry of a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their first cause of action, inter alia, to direct the defendants to repair or replace a retaining wall on the defendants' property in compliance with the terms of an access agreement executed by the parties on the same date. The stipulation provided that if the defendants failed to comply with the terms of the judgment, the parties would place the remaining causes of action on the trial calendar. After the defendants failed to timely comply with the terms of the judgment, the plaintiffs placed the remaining causes of action on the trial calendar. Thereafter, the defendants obtained multiple adjournments of the trial date in an effort to comply with the terms of the access agreement. When the defendants' attorney failed to appear for trial on the third adjourned date of January 28, 2008, the court held an inquest on the issue of damages and entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on February 28, 2008. On April 23, 2008, the defendants moved to vacate the judgment.

To vacate their default in appearing at the trial, the defendants were required to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense to the action (see CPLR 5015[a][1]; Zaidi v New York Bldg. Contrs., Ltd., 61 AD3d 747; Vasquez v New York City Hous. Auth., 51 AD3d 781, 782; Conserve Elec., Inc. v Tulger Contr. Corp., 36 AD3d 747). Although the court may, in its discretion, accept law office failure as a reasonable excuse (see CPLR 2005; Putney v Pearlman, 203 AD2d 333), "'a pattern of willful default and neglect' should not be excused" (Roussodimou v Zafiriadis, 238 AD2d 568, 569, quoting Gannon v Johnson Scale Co., 189 AD2d 1052, 1052). The statements by the defendants' attorney regarding his personal problems did [*2]not adequately explain the defendants' failure to comply with the time and terms of the court-ordered stipulation, judgment, and access agreement dated October 26, 2007, and to comply with those terms during the subsequent extensions of those deadlines, and defense counsel's failure to appear on the adjourned trial date even though he knew his attempts to further adjourn the trial had been unsuccessful (see Joseph v GMAC Leasing Corp., 44 AD3d 905; Wechsler v First Unum Life Ins. Co., 295 AD2d 340; Foster v Gherardi, 201 AD2d 701). Furthermore, the defendants failed to demonstrate that they have a meritorious defense (see Buchanan v Cardozo, 24 AD2d 620, 621, affd 16 NY2d 1029). Accordingly, the defendants' motion was properly denied. 

The bold is mine.

CPLR R. 3216 Want of prosecution

(b) No dismissal shall be directed under any portion of subdivision (a) of this rule and no court initiative shall be taken or motion made thereunder unless the following conditions precedent have been complied with:

(3) The court or party seeking such relief, as the case may be, shall have served a written demand by registered or certified mail requiring the party against whom such relief is sought to resume prosecution of the action and to serve and file a note of issue within ninety days after receipt of such demand, and further stating that the default by the party upon whom such notice is served in complying with such demand within said ninety day period will serve as a basis for a motion by the party serving said demand for dismissal as against him for unreasonably neglecting to proceed.

CPLR § 2004 Extensions of time generally

Davis v Cardiovascular Consultants of Long Is., P.C., 2009 NY Slip Op 06501 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

An order entered November 7, 2007, which warned the plaintiff that the failure to serve and file a note of issue would result in dismissal of the action, had the same effect as a valid 90-day notice pursuant to CPLR 3216 (see Huger v Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., 58 AD3d 682; Benitez v Mutual of Am. Life Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 708; Giannoccoli v One Cent Park W. Assocs., 15 AD3d 348; Betty v City of New York, 12 AD3d 472). Having received a 90-day notice, the plaintiff was required either to file a timely note of issue or to move, before the default date, for an extension of time pursuant to CPLR 2004 (see Benitez v Mutual of Am. Life Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 708; Bokhari v Home Depot U.S.A., 4 AD3d 381; McKinney v Corby, 295 AD2d 580, 581). The plaintiff did neither, and the action was subsequently dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3216.

To vacate the dismissal of an action pursuant to CPLR 3216, a plaintiff must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default in complying with the 90-day notice and a meritorious cause of action (see CPLR 3216[e]; Felix v County of Nassau, 52 AD3d 653; Petersen v Lysaght, Lysaght & Kramer, P.C., 47 AD3d 783). Here, the plaintiff failed to submit any expert medical opinion evidence to demonstrate the merit of his medical malpractice action (see Mosberg v Elahi, 80 NY2d 941, 942; Fiore v Galang, 64 NY2d 999, 1000-1001; Salch v Paratore, 60 NY2d 851, 852; Picot v City of New York, 50 AD3d 757; Burke v Klein, 269 AD2d 348, 348-349; Abelard [*2]v Interfaith Med. Ctr., 202 AD2d 615, 616; Feinblum v Dybner, 197 AD2d 560). Accordingly, that branch of his motion which was, in effect, to vacate the dismissal of the action pursuant to CPLR 3216 should have been denied.

Strange.  Consider CPLR R. 3216(b)(3).  Specifically, the "registered or certified" mail part.

Again, the bold is mine.